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Abstract
We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in a duopoly where firms
may either undertake independent ventures or form a cartel for cost-reducing
R&D investments. By comparing the profit and welfare perfomances of the
two settings in steady state, we show that private and social incentives to-
wards R&D cooperation coincide for all admissible levels of the technological
spillovers characterising innovative activity. This results stems from smooth-
ing the investment reﬀort over the time horizon of the game.
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1 Introduction
The role of technological spillovers in shaping the incentives to conduct R&D
for process innovation has attracted a wide attention in the existing literature
on oligopoly theory. The most relevant contributions in this vein are those
of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al. (1992), Suzumura
(1992) and Amir (2000), to mention only a few. A general appraisal of
the advantages associated with R&D cooperation, and the related policy
measures, can be found in Katz and Ordover (1990).1
The theoretical debate on the private and social advantages generated
by R&D cooperation was triggered by an analogous policy debate on the
same issue, leading to the National Research Cooperation Act that passed in
the US in 1984.2 Then, following Katz (1986), a large body of literature has
discussed the theoretical and empirical facets of welfare-improving technology
policies based upon two forms of R&D cooperation, namely, R&D cartels and
research joint ventures.3 Here, we shall briefly summarise the approaches
adopted in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992).
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) consider a homogeneous Cournot
duopoly, where each firm enjoys a spillover from the rival in terms of the
final outcome of R&D activity, in the following sense. To firm i, investing
ki costs an amount bk2i , which captures the presence of decreasing returns
to innovative activity, but the total eﬀective R&D contributing to reduce
1The underlying relationship between innovation and market structure came to the fore
even earlier, of course. To this regard, see Spence (1984) and Reinganum (1989), inter alia.
The above mentioned contributions share with Brander and Spencer (1983) the concept
of R&D as a cost-reducing activity, adding to the Brander-Spencer setup the possibility
of information transmission or technological externalities.
2For the EU and Japan, see Goto and Wakasugi (1988) and the CE Commission (1990).
3A relatively scanty attention has been paid to the possibility that any form of R&D
cooperation facilitates collusion, either in prices or in quantities. To this regard, see Martin
(1995), Lambertini et al. (1998, 2002, 2003) and Cabral (2000).
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firm i’s marginal cost ci is in fact Ki = ki + βkj, where β is the techno-
logical externality generated from the rival’s investment kj. Therefore, given
a generic initial marginal cost c, we have ci = c − Ki. In Kamien et al.
(1992), instead, the spillover eﬀect is measured in terms of Dollars or Euro,
in the sense that they assume each firm to have a concave R&D technology
f (Yi) , where Yi = yi + βyj is the eﬀective R&D eﬀort, comprehensive of
the external eﬀect, and the reduction in firm i’s marginal cost is given by
ci = c − f (Yi) . This technology is coupled with linear R&D costs equal to
yi for each firm. In other terms, what changes from the first to the second
model is the way chosen to make the setup concave. In the former case,
concavity is achieved through a convex R&D cost function, while in the lat-
ter case the same property rests upon a concave R&D technology. Using
f (Yi) =
p
yi + βyj, Amir (2000) shows that the two models are isomorphic
up to the transformation ki = yi/
√
b. For this reason, one can focus upon
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). They compare two diﬀerent games: one
where firms behave noncooperatively in choosing both R&D eﬀorts and out-
put levels, the other where firms form a cartel in the R&D stage, choosing
thus R&D investments so as to maximise joint profits in that stage only, while
they continue to adopt a Nash behaviour in the market stage. Comparing the
two setups, d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) find that (i) for high spillover
levels [β > 1/2] , R&D investments - and also cost reduction, clearly - are
higher under cooperative behaviour, and conversely for low spillovers; (ii) for
high spillover levels [β > 1/2] , social welfare is higher under cooperative be-
haviour, and conversely. Unfortunately, they also find that cartel profits are
higher than noncooperative profits when spillovers are low [β < 1/2] . This
yields an undesirable conflict between private and social incentives towards
R&D cooperation (or cartelisation).4
4The literature on this topic has also discussed the issue of equilibrium stability, as for
low levels of R&D costs (i.e., low levels of parameter b) there exists no internal solution
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The d’Aspremont-Jacquemin model, or some variation of it, has been
used thereafter to investigate several related issues, e.g., the possibility of
setting up research joint ventures in relation to absorptive capacity (Kamien
and Zang, 2000), the eﬃciency comparison between Bertrand and Cournot
behaviour with product diﬀerentiation (Qiu, 1997), the endogenisation of
spillovers (Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1998; Poyago-Theotoky, 1999; Amir and
Wooders, 1999, 2003) and the eﬀects of increasing the number of firms in the
market (Hinloopen, 2000).5
However, the above mentioned lack of overlapping between social and pri-
vate incentives towards cooperation has remained unsolved. To tackle this
problem, we adopt an explicitly dynamic approach to describe the R&D ac-
tivity aimed at process innovation, modelled as a diﬀerential game whose
basic components are as close as possible to the original ones contained in
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). As in their paper, we confine our atten-
tion to the alternative cases where firm either behave fully noncooperatively
or build up a cartel in R&D investments. We compare steady state profits
and social welfare at the subgame perfect equilibria of the two cases, find-
ing that irrespective of the spillover level, R&D cooperation is preferable to
noncooperative behaviour from both a private and a social point of view.
Intuitively, this result stems from investment smoothing, which is carried
out by firms over the time horizon of the dynamic setting, while it is utterly
impossible to achieve in a static two-stage game where firms are compelled
to invest one-shot the full amount of resources required to achieve the equi-
librium eﬃciency level of their productive technology.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates
as second order conditions are not met. On this issue, see Henriques (1990), d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1990), Qiu (1997) and Amir and Wooders (1998).
5A large amount of research has also been carried out on the empirical side. See
Lambertini et al. (2004) and the references therein.
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the dynamic setup. Independent ventures are investigated in section 3, while
the performance of the R&D cartel is described in section 4. Section 5 con-
tains some concluding remarks.
2 The setup
We consider a duopoly with homogeneous goods over continuous time, t ∈
[0,∞) . In every instant, the market demand function writes as follows:
p(t) = A− q1(t)− q2(t) . (1)
Each firm i supplies the market through a technology characterised by
a constant marginal cost. Accordingly, her instantaneous cost function is
Ci (ci, qi, t) = ci(t)qi(t). the marginal cost borne by firm i evolves over time
as described by the following kinematic equation:
dci(t)
dt
≡ ·ci = ci (t) [−ki(t)− βkj(t) + δ] , (2)
where ki(t) is the R&D eﬀort exerted by firm i at time t, while parameter β ∈
[0, 1] measures the positive technological spillover that firm i receives from
the R&D activity of firm j. Parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] is a constant depreciation
rate measuring the instantaneous decrease in productive eﬃciency due to the
ageing of technology. Equation (2) can be rewritten as follows:
·ci
ci (t)
= −ki(t)− βkj(t) + δ , (3)
so as to highlight that the rate of change of firm i’s marginal cost over
time is linear in the instantaneous investment eﬀorts. That is, (2) is indeed
adynamic version of the linear R&D technology employed by d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin in the static model.
The instantaneous cost of setting up a single R&D laboratory is:
Γ(k, t) = b [k(t)]2 , (4)
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where k(t) is the R&D eﬀort carried out at time t within the laboratory, and b
is a positive parameter. Now define the instantaneous R&D investment of
firm i as Γi(ki, t). If firms undertake independent ventures (i.e., each firms
sets up her own R&D division or laboratory), then:
Γi(ki, t) = b [ki(t)]2 . (5)
In such a case, firms may behave either noncooperatively or collusively.
Throughout the game, firms discount future profits a the common and con-
stant discount rate ρ > 0.
3 Independent ventures
In this setting, firms adopt a strictly noncooperative behaviour in choosing
both the output levels and the R&D eﬀorts, each firm operating her own
R&D division. The Hamiltonian of firm i is:
Hi(q,k, c, t) = e−ρt{[A− q1(t)− q2(t)− ci(t)] qi(t)− b [ki(t)]2+ (6)
−λii(t)ci(t) [ki(t) + βkj(t)− δ]− λij(t)cj(t) [kj(t) + βki(t)− δ]}
where λij(t) = µij(t)eρt is the co-state variable (evaluated at time t) associ-
ated with the state variable cj(t), and q,k, c are the vectors of control and
state variables.
As a first step, we prove the following result:
Lemma 1 The open-loop Nash equilibrium of the game with independent
ventures is subgame (or Markov) perfect.
Proof. We are going to show that the present setup is a perfect game in
the sense of Leitmann and Schmitendorf (1978) and Feichtinger (1983). In
summary, a diﬀerential game is perfect whenever the closed-loop equilibrium
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collapses into the open-loop one, the latter being thus strongly time consis-
tent, i.e., subgame perfect.6 Consider the closed-loop information structure.
The relevant first order conditions (FOCs) are:
∂Hi (., t)
∂qi(t)
= A− 2qi(t)− qj(t)− ci(t) = 0 ; (7)
∂Hi (., t)
∂ki(t)
= −2bki(t)− λii(t)ci(t)− βλij(t)cj(t) = 0 . (8)
As a first step, observe that (7) only contains firm i’s state variable, so that in
choosing the optimal output at any time during the game firm imay disregard
the current eﬃciency of the rival. That is, there is no feedback eﬀect in the
output choice. Conversely, at first sight there seem to be a feedback between
the R&D decisions, as (8) indeed contains both state variables, at least for
any positive spillover eﬀect.7 the core of the proof consists in showing that
no feedback eﬀect are actually present, even for positive spillover levels.
Taking the above considerations into account, the adjoint or co-state
equations are:
−∂Hi (., t)
∂ci(t)
− ∂Hi (., t)
∂kj(t)
· ∂k
∗
j (., t)
∂ci(t)
=
∂λii(t)
∂t
− ρλii(t)⇔ (9)
∂λii(t)
∂t
= qi (t)+λii(t) [ki(t) + βkj(t) + ρ− δ]−
β
2b
λji(t) [λij(t)cj(t) + βλii(t)ci(t)]
−∂Hi (., t)
∂cj(t)
− ∂Hi (., t)
∂ki(t)
· ∂k
∗
i (., t)
∂cj(t)
=
∂λij(t)
∂t
− ρλij(t)⇔ (10)
∂λij(t)
∂t
= λij(t)
½
[kj(t) + βki(t) + ρ− δ]−
β
2b
[2bki (t) + λii(t)ci(t) + βλij(t)cj(t)]
¾
6The label ‘perfect game’ is due to Fershtman (1987), where one can find a general tech-
nique to identify any such games. Another class of games where open-loop equilibria are
subgame perfect is investigated by Reinganum (1982). For further details, see Mehlmann
(1988, ch. 4) and Dockner et al. (2000, ch. 7).
7Intuitively, if β = 0, then the two investment plans are completely independent and
therefore it is apparent that no feedback eﬀect operates.
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where
∂Hi (., t)
∂kj(t)
· ∂k
∗
j (., t)
∂ci(t)
(11)
capture the feedback eﬀects, and partial derivatives ∂k∗j (., t) /∂ci(t) are cal-
culated using the optimal values of investments as from FOC (8):
k∗j (., t) = −
λjj(t)cj(t) + βλji(t)ci(t)
2b
. (12)
These conditions must be evaluated along with the initial conditions
{ci(0)} = {c0,i} and the transversality conditions
lim
t→∞
λij(t) · cj(t) = 0 , i, j = 1, 2. (13)
From (10), we note that ∂λij(t)/∂t = 0 in λij(t) = 0. Then, using this
piece of information, we may rewrite the expression for the optimal invest-
ment of firm i as follows:
k∗i (., t) = −
λii(t)ci(t)
2b
, (14)
which entails that ∂k∗i (., t) /∂cj(t) = 0. By the underlying symmetry of the
model, this holds for both firms, i.e., feedback (cross-)eﬀects are nil along
the equilibrium path. Accordingly, the open-loop equilibrium is a degenerate
closed-loop one, and it is strongly time consistent, or equivalently, subgame
perfect. It is also worth observing that this procedure shows that FOCs are
indeed unaﬀected by initial conditions as well. The property whereby the
FOCs on controls are independent of states and initial conditions after replac-
ing the optimal values of the co-state variables is known as state-redundancy,
and the game itself as state-redundant or perfect.
On the basis of Lemma 1, we can proceed with the characterisation of
the open-loop solution. The FOCs on control as well as the transversality
conditions are the same as above, while the co-state equations simplify as
follows:
−∂Hi (., t)
∂ci(t)
=
∂λii(t)
∂t
− ρλii(t)⇔ (15)
7
∂λii(t)
∂t
= qi (t) + λii(t) [ki(t) + βkj(t) + ρ− δ]
−∂Hi (., t)
∂cj(t)
=
∂λij(t)
∂t
− ρλij(t)⇔ (16)
∂λij(t)
∂t
= λij(t) [kj(t) + βki(t) + ρ− δ]
From FOCs (7-8) we have, respectively:
q∗i (t) =
A− qj(t)− ci(t)
2
, (17)
ki (t) = −
[λii(t)ci(t) + βλij(t)cj(t)]
2b
. (18)
While (17) has the usual appearance of a standard Cournot best reply func-
tion, the optimal R&D eﬀort in (18) depends upon co-state variables. Such
expression can be diﬀerentiated w.r.t. time to get the dynamic equation of
ki(t) :
dki(t)
dt
≡
·
ki = −
ci(t)
∂λii(t)
∂t
+ λii (t)
dci(t)
dt
+ β
·
cj(t)
∂λij(t)
∂t
+ λij (t)
dcj(t)
dt
¸
2b
(19)
with ∂λii(t)/∂t and ∂λij(t)/∂t obtaining from (9-10). Then, (19) can be
further simplified by using
λii (t) = −
2bki (t) + βλij (t) cj (t)
ci (t)
(20)
which obtains from (8). As to the second co-state variable, its dynamic
equation (10) must be treated autonomously8 and, by imposing stationarity,
8That is, whenever the FOCs of firm i cannot determine the optimal value of the co-
state variable attached to the rival’s state dynamics, the co-state equation pertaining to
the state variable of firm j is to be treated as an additional state equation, on which one
must impose stationarity in equilibrium. For more details on this issue, see Bas¸ar and
Olsder (1982, 19952), Mehlmann (1988) and Dockner et al. (2000).
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i.e., ∂λij(t)/∂t = 0, we obtain λij (t) = 0. This yields:
·
ki = −
ci (t)
2b
·
qi (t)−
2bki (t)
ci (t)
¸
. (21)
The next step consists in solving the system of best reply functions (17),
yielding the Cournot-Nash output level of firm i as a function of state vari-
ables:
qCNi (t) =
A− 2ci(t) + cj(t)
3
(22)
which can be plugged into (21). After imposing the symmetry condition
cj(t) = ci(t) = c(t), we may characterise the dynamics of the R&D eﬀort of
firm i is terms of her own state and control variables only:
·
ki = ρki (t)−
c (t) [A− c (t)]
6b
. (23)
Imposing the stationarity condition
·
ki = 0 we obtain:
kIV (t) =
c (t) [A− c (t)]
6bρ
≥ 0 for all c (t) ∈ [0, A ] , (24)
where the superscript IV stands for independent ventures. Before proceeding
to the characterisation of the steady state equilibrium, it is worth noting that,
in general, the level of c (t) will depend upon the technological spillover β,
so that we can write:
∂kIV
∂β
=
[A− 2c (t)] · ∂c (t) /∂β
6bρ
(25)
which, in principle, may take either sign, depending upon the relative size of
A and c (t) as well as the sign of ∂c (t) /∂β.
The steady state level of marginal cost c(t) can be found by solving:
·c = −c(t)
£
kIV (t) (1 + β)− δc(t)
¤
= 0 (26)
which yields:
c = 0; c =
A (1 + β)±p(1 + β) [A2 (1 + β)− 24bδρ]
2 (1 + β)
(27)
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All solutions in (27) are real if and only if δρ ≤ A2 (1 + β) / (24b) . If so, they
also satisfy the requirement c ∈ [0, A ] . By checking the stability conditions,
we may prove the following:
Proposition 2 Provided that δρ ≤ A2 (1 + β) / (24b) , the steady state point
cIV =
A (1 + β)−
p
(1 + β) [A2 (1 + β)− 24bδρ]
2 (1 + β)
kIV =
δ
1 + β
is the unique saddle point equilibrium of the game with independent ventures.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Equilibrium output and profits are:
qIV =
A (1 + β) +
p
(1 + β) [A2 (1 + β)− 24bδρ]
6 (1 + β)
; (28)
πIV =
A2 (1 + β)2 − 6bδ [3δ + 2ρ (1 + β)] +A
q
(1 + β)3 [A2 (1 + β)− 24bδρ]
18 (1 + β)
,
(29)
From the steady state expressions of R&D investment, one can immedi-
ately derive the following intuitive property:
∂kIV
∂β
= − δ
(1 + β)2
< 0, (30)
which implies that, as the size of technological spillover eﬀects increases,
the incentive to invest in process innovation shrinks as it becomes increas-
ingly diﬃcult to internalise the benefits from R&D activity. Observe that,
in steady state, R&D investment is needed only to make up for the depre-
ciation rate, with each firm receiving a positive externality from the other.
Indeed, the total eﬀective investment perceived from the viewpoint of firm i is
kIV (1 + β) = δ, which entails that the reduction of firm i’s individual R&D
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eﬀort if fully made up for by the spillover eﬀect. This, however, accounts for
the specific functional form of kIV in the steady state only, keeping in mind
(25).
Moreover, in steady state the following also holds:
∂cIV
∂β
= − 6bδρq
(1 + β)3 [A2 (1 + β)− 24bδρ]
< 0. (31)
This is due to the fact that any increase in β entails a reduction in kIV , as
we know from (30). Indeed, using (25) and (30), we can write:
[A− 2c (t)] · ∂c (t) /∂β
6bρ
= − δ
(1 + β)2
(32)
which must hold in equilibrium. From the above condition, we obtain:
∂c (t)
∂β
= − 6bδρ
(1 + β)2 [A− 2c (t)]
; (33)
Then, noting that A > 2cIV , it follows that ∂cIV /∂β < 0.
Consumer surplus and welfare in steady state are:
CSIV ≡
¡
A− pIV
¢P2
i=1 qIVi
2
=
h
A
√
1 + β +
p
A2 (1 + β)− 24bδρ
i2
18 (1 + β)
(34)
SW IV ≡ 2πIV + CSIV = (35)
=
2
·
A2 (1 + β)2 − 3bδ [3δ + 4ρ (1 + β)] +A
q
(1 + β)3 [A2 (1 + β)− 24bδρ]
¸
9 (1 + β)
.
4 R&D cartel
Here, we examine the case where firms noncooperatively choose output levels,
while maximising joint profits w.r.t. the choice of their respective R&D
eﬀorts. As in the previous section, each firm operates her own laboratory.
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This amounts to imposing a priori the symmetry conditions ci(t) = cj(t) =
c(t) and ki(t) = kj(t) = k(t). The state equation now looks as follows:
·c = c(t) [− (1 + β) k(t) + δ] . (36)
Therefore, the Hamiltonian of firm i can be written as follows:
Hi(q, k, c, t) = e−ρt{[A− q1(t)− q2(t)− c(t)] qi(t)− b [k(t)]2+ (37)
+λ(t)c(t) [− (1 + β) k(t) + δ]}
where λ(t) = µ(t)eρt is the co-state variable (evaluated at time t) associated
with the state variable c(t), and q is the vector of individual outputs. As in
the previous case, it can be shown that the open-loop equilibrium is subgame
perfect.9 The open-loop first order conditions for the optimum are:
∂Hi (., t)
∂qi(t)
= A− 2qi(t)− qj(t)− c(t) = 0 ; (38)
∂Hi (., t)
∂k(t)
= −2bk(t)− λ(t) (1 + β) c(t) = 0 ; (39)
−∂Hi (., t)
∂c(t)
=
∂λ(t)
∂t
− ρλ , (40)
along with the initial conditions {c(0)} = {c0} , and the transversality con-
ditions
lim
t→∞
λ(t) · c(t) = 0 . (41)
Solving (39), we obtain λ(t) = −2bk(t)/ [(1 + β) c(t)] , entailing also:
dk(t)
dt
≡
·
k = −(1 + β)
2b
·
c(t)
∂λ(t)
∂t
+ λ (t)
dc(t)
dt
¸
. (42)
From (40) we obtain:
∂λ(t)
∂t
= qi(t)− [δ − ρ− (1 + β) k(t)]λ(t) . (43)
9The details are omitted for brevity, as they closely replicate the same line as in the
proof of Lemma 1.
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This expression, together with the optimal values of the co-state variable and
the Cournot-Nash output level qCN = [A− c(t)] /3, can be plugged into (42),
which simplifies as follows:
·
k = ρk(t)− c(t) [A− c(t)] (1 + β)
6b
. (44)
Therefore, dk(t)/dt = 0 in correspondence of:
kCl(t) = c(t) [A− c(t)] (1 + β)
6bρ
, (45)
where superscript Cl stands for cartel. Before proceeding, we may com-
pare kCl(t) against kIV (t), as defined in (24), to ascertain that the following
property:
c(t) [A− c(t)] (1 + β)
6bρ
>
c (t) [A− c (t)]
6bρ
⇒ kCl(t) > kIV (t) (46)
holds for all β ∈ (0, 1] and c(t) > 0. This entails:
Lemma 3 Setting up a cartel in the R&D stage leads firms to invest more
than in the fully noncooperative case, for all positive levels of spillovers and
marginal cost.
Of course, the reason for this result is that R&D cooperation permits to
better internalise the beneficial externality, therefore boosting firms’ incen-
tives to invest. The consequence of the above Lemma is that the private
and social desirability of R&D cooperation drastically hinges upon its ability
of reducing marginal cost significantly below the level resulting from Nash
behaviour.
Plugging kCl(t) into the state dynamics and imposing the stationarity
condition, we have:
·c = −c (t)
"
c(t) [A− c(t)] (1 + β)2
6bρ
− δ
#
= 0 (47)
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yielding:
c = 0; c =
A (1 + β)±
q
A2 (1 + β)2 − 24bδρ
2 (1 + β)
. (48)
The above analysis allows us to state:
Proposition 4 Provided that δρ ≤ A2 (1 + β)2 / (24b) , the steady state point
cCl =
A (1 + β)−
q
A2 (1 + β)2 − 24bδρ
2 (1 + β)
kCl =
δ
1 + β
is the unique saddle point equilibrium of the game where firm set up a cartel
in the R&D stage.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
The steady state R&D eﬀort is exactly the same as in the noncooperative
case. This is obviously due to the fact that, in both cases, the investment
needed to keep constant firm i’s marginal cost is km (1 + β) = δ, m = IV, Cl.
What changes, instead, is the steady state level of the marginal cost. To this
regard, it can be easily verified that
cIV − cCl ∝
q
A2 (1 + β)2 − 24bδρ
1 + β
−
p
A2 (1 + β)− 24bδρ√
1 + β
(49)
which is strictly positive for all β ∈ (0, 1] .
Individual output and profits under R&D cartelisation are:
qCl =
A (1 + β) +
q
A2 (1 + β)2 − 24bδρ
6 (1 + β)
; (50)
πCl =
A2 (1 + β)2 − 6bδ (3δ + 2ρ) +A (1 + β)
q
A2 (1 + β)2 − 24bδρ
18 (1 + β)2
. (51)
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Consumer surplus and welfare in steady state are:
CSCl ≡
¡
A− pCl
¢P2
i=1 qCli
2
=
·
A (1 + β) +
q
A2 (1 + β)2 − 24bδρ
¸2
18 (1 + β)2
(52)
SWCl ≡ 2πCl + CSCl = (53)
=
2
·
A2 (1 + β)2 − 3bδ (3δ + 4ρ) +A (1 + β)
q
A2 (1 + β)2 − 24bδρ
¸
9 (1 + β)2
.
Propositions 2 and 4 immediately entail the following Corollary:
Corollary 5 For all β ∈ (0, 1] the parameter region wherein the R&D car-
tel problem admits an internal optimum is wider than the parameter region
wherein noncooperative R&D activity yields an internal optimum.
Proof. To show this, it suﬃces to verify that
A2 (1 + β)2 / (24b) > A2 (1 + β) / (24b) (54)
for all β ∈ (0, 1] .
This of course stems from the fact that R&D cooperation is substantially
equivalent to a reduction in ρ (or δ, or both). That is, when investing within
a cartel, firms behave as if they were more patient than in the alternative
case.
5 Private and social incentives to R&D co-
operation
Now we are in a position to assess the incentive to activate a cartel in the
R&D stage, both from the standpoints of each firm and from the regulator’s,
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in the parameter region where both organizational arrangements are admissi-
ble, i.e., δρ ≤ A2 (1 + β) / (24b). This task involves, respectively, evaluating
πCl against πIV and SWCl against SW IV . In both cases, we obtain:
πCl − πIV ∝ SWCl − SW IV ∝ Θ (55)
Θ ≡ 12bβδρ+A (1 + β)
·q
A2 (1 + β)2 − 24bδρ−
p
1 + β
p
A2 (1 + β)− 24bδρ
¸
with the expression Θ being positive for all β ∈ (0, 1] . Therefore, we have
proved our main result:10
Proposition 6 Consider the parameter range δρ ≤ A2 (1 + β) / (24b) . For
all positive spillover levels, the R&D cartel is preferable to independent ven-
tures from private and social standpoints alike.
As a final remark, we may observe that the beneficial eﬀect of R&D
cartelisation on social welfare comes from both sides of the market, since:
πCl > πIV and CSCl > CSIV (56)
for all β ∈ (0, 1] . This can be explained on the following grounds. Given that
cIV − cCl > 0, one expects firms to expand output under cooperative R&D,
as against case where they undertake independent ventures. By comparing
(28) and (50), there indeed emerges that qCl > qIV always. Accordingly,
consumer surplus is enhanced by R&D cooperation because industry output
is larger and market price is lower than in the fully noncooperative setting.
As for the performance of firms, the increase in profits generated by the
cartel arrangement is not obvious a priori, because the increase in productive
eﬃciency is surely beneficial but the opposite holds for the output expansion.
In balance, it appears that the first eﬀects outweighs the second.
10Also note that, for all β ∈ (0, 1] , the parameter region where the cartel solution is
admissible, i.e., δρ ≤ A2 (1 + β)2 / (24b) , is wider than the analogous region defined for
independent ventures to yield an admissible solution, i.e., δρ ≤ A2 (1 + β) / (24b) .
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The interpretation of these results (in particular, Proposition 6) is straight-
forward. With convex R&D costs, allowing firms to smooth their investment
plans over some time span11 is advantageous both because it permits firms to
enhance profits and because it yields a higher welfare, as Jensen’s inequality
applied to the cost function Γi(ki, t) trivially implies.
6 Concluding remarks
We have analysed dynamic R&D investments for cost-reducing innovation in
a Cournot duopoly where firms may either compete or cooperate in the R&D
phase. The foregoing analysis has shown that a unique stable equilibrium
exists in each setting. By comparing the steady state profit and welfare
performances of the industry in the two cases, there emerges that private
and social incentives towards R&D cooperation coincide for all admissible
levels of the technological spillovers characterising innovative activity, in the
sense that cartelisation dominates competition from both standpoints over
the whole admissible parameter range.
The setup employed in the present paper is a dynamic version of the static
game examined in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). The drastic diﬀerence
between our results and theirs relies upon smoothing the investment eﬀorts
over a long time horizon, a perspective which is ruled out by definition in a
static setting.
11The length of the horizon and the assumption that time be treated as a continuous
variable are both, in fact, immaterial to the conclusions. It can be easily shown that an
analogous diﬀerential game over t ∈ [0, T ] (no matter whether in continuous or discrete
time) would produce qualitatively equivalent results.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 2
Assume δρ ≤ A2 (1 + β) / (24b) . The stability properties of the system (23-
26) can be assessed by evaluating the trace and determinant of the following
Jacobian matrix:
JIV ≡


∂ ·c
∂c
= δ − (1 + β) k ∂
·c
∂k
= − (1 + β) c
∂
·
k
∂c
= −A− 2c
6b
∂
·
k
∂k
= r


in correspondence of the steady state values of c and k. At c = k = 0, the
trace is T (JIV ) = δ + ρ > 0 and the determinant is ∆ (JIV ) = δρ > 0.
Therefore, such a point is unstable. In correspondence of
k =
c [A− c]
6bρ
; c =
A (1 + β) +
p
(1 + β) [A2 (1 + β)− 24bδρ]
2 (1 + β)
(a1)
we obtain T (JIV ) = ρ > 0 and
∆ (JIV ) =
A2 (1 + β)− 24bδρ+A
p
(1 + β) [A2 (1 + β)− 24bδρ]
12b
(a2)
which is clearly positive in the admissible parameter range. Finally, in
k = c [A− c]
6bρ
; c =
A (1 + β)−
p
(1 + β) [A2 (1 + β)− 24bδρ]
2 (1 + β)
(a3)
we have T (JIV ) = ρ > 0 again, and
∆ (JIV ) =
A2 (1 + β)− 24bδρ−A
p
(1 + β) [A2 (1 + β)− 24bδρ]
12b
. (a4)
In this case, ∆ (JIV ) < 0 in the admissible parameter region. Therefore, (a3)
is the unique stable steady state point of the dynamic system; in particular,
it is a saddle point. Simplifying the expression for optimal investment in
steady state, we obtain kIV = δ/ (1 + β) .¥
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7.2 Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 4
Assume δρ ≤ A2 (1 + β)2 / (24b) . The stability properties of the system (36-
44) can be assessed by evaluating the trace and determinant of the following
Jacobian matrix:
JCl ≡


∂ ·c
∂c
= δ − (1 + β) k ∂
·c
∂k
= − (1 + β) c
∂
·
k
∂c
= −(1 + β) (A− 2c)
6b
∂
·
k
∂k
= r


in correspondence of the steady state values of c and k. Observe that the
only diﬀerence between JCl and JIV is to be found in ∂
·
k/∂c, since in the
cooperative case this partial derivative fully embodies the spillover eﬀect,
which is absent in the previous case.
At c = k = 0, the trace is T (JCl) = δ + ρ > 0 and the determinant is
∆ (JCl) = δρ > 0. Therefore, such a point is unstable. In correspondence of
k =
c [A− c]
6bρ
; c =
A (1 + β) +
q
A2 (1 + β)2 − 24bδρ
2 (1 + β)
(a5)
we obtain T (JCl) = ρ > 0 and
∆ (JCl) =
q
A2 (1 + β)2 − 24bδρ
·
A (1 + β) +
q
A2 (1 + β)2 − 24bδρ
¸
12b
(a6)
which is clearly positive in the admissible parameter range. Finally, in
k =
c [A− c]
6bρ
; c =
A (1 + β)−
q
A2 (1 + β)2 − 24bδρ
2 (1 + β)
(a7)
we have T (JCl) = ρ > 0 again, and
∆ (JCl) =
A2 (1 + β)2 − 24bδρ−A (1 + β)
q
A2 (1 + β)2 − 24bδρ
12b
. (a8)
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In this case, ∆ (JCl) < 0 in the admissible parameter region. Therefore, (a7)
is the unique stable steady state point of the dynamic system; in particular,
it is a saddle point. Simplifying the expression for optimal investment in
steady state, we obtain again kCl = δ/ (1 + β) = kIV .¥
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